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STATE OF NEW YORK 
SUPREME COURT 
In The Matter of WILLIAM SMITH, 
-against-
NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF PAROLE, 
For A Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules. 
COUNTY OF ALBANY 
Petitioner, 
Respondent, 
Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Term 
Appearances: 
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding 
RJI # 01-14-ST6226 Index No. 5331 -14 
William Smith 
Inmate No. 97-B-0647 
Petitioner, Pro Se 
Collins Correctional Facility 
P.O. Box 490, Middle Road 
Collins, NY 14034-0490 
Eric T. Schneidennan 
Attorney General 
State ofNew York 
Attorney For Respondent 
The Capitol 
Albany, New York 12224 
(Joshua E. McMahon, 
Assistant Attorney General 
of Counsel) 
DECISION/ORDER/JUDGMENT 
George B. Ceresia, Jr., Justice 
The petitioner, an inmate currently housed at Collins Correctional Facility, 
commenced the instant CPLR Article 78 proceeding to review a determination of respondent 
dated December 11, 2013 to deny petitioner discretionary release on parole. Petitioner is 
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serving a term of 16 years to life, as a persistent violent felony offender, upon conviction of 
the crime of assault 1st degree. Among the many arguments set forth in the petition, 
petitioner indicates that he has completed the following programs during his current 
incarceration: aggression replacement training; alternatives to violence project; Phase III; 
Prison Fellowship Ministries. He lists the following under the heading 
"educational/vocational accomplishments": a general equivalency diploma; electronics tester; 
salvage laborer; and inventory clerk. He indicates that he has received a letter of acceptance 
for the re-entry program sponsored by the Back to Basics Outreach Ministry which, he says, 
assists newly released inmates in adjusting to life in the community. The petitioner argues 
that the Division of Parole has failed to comply with the provisions of Executive Law § 259-c 
(4) by reason that it has not published written procedures for its use in making parole 
decisions (see Executive Law§ 259-c). He maintains that Commissioner Ludlow gave only 
' 
cursory consideration of his C01\.1PAS Risk and Needs Assessment. In petitioner's view, 
proper consideration and application of the C01\.1P AS Instrument would compel the Board 
to conclude that he be should be released. As part of his argument, the petition criticizes the 
Board for not identifying the specific risk that the petition still poses to the safety and welfare 
of the community. The petitioner further maintains that the respondent has not documented 
his positive acts through preparing what is known as a "commendable behavior report" 
pursuant to DOCCS Directive 4006. 
The p'etitioner argues that the determination violated his substantive and procedural 
r.ights to due process. He maintains that the parole interview was unfair; that the Parole 
Board had a hostile and adversarial attitude towards him; and that they improperly considered 
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the instant offense and his prior criminal history. He contends that the Parole Board paid no. 
attention to his rehabilitative efforts; and that the detennination constituted an unauthorized 
re-sentencing. The petitioner further maintains that the Parole decision was predetermined, 
as evidenced by the fact that most of the parole interview focused on his criminal offense. 
He asserts that the Parole Board erred in not providing him guidance with regard to how he 
could improve his chances for parole in the future . The petitioner also maintains that the 
Parole Board was under the incorrect impression that his victim had died, when in reality the 
victim had survived the assault. 
The reasons for the respondent's determination to deny petitioner release on parole 
are set forth as follows: 
"Denied, hold for 24 months. Next appearance date: December 
2015. 
"Following careful review and deliberation of your record and 
interview, this panel concludes that discretionary release is not 
presently warranted due to concern for the public safety and 
welfare. The following factors were properly weighed and 
considered. Your instant offense in Buffalo in March 1996 
involved assault first. Your criminal history includes 
unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, sto I en property, assault and 
drug related offenses. Your institutional programming indicates 
progress and achievement which is noted to your credit. Your 
disciplinary record reflects approximately five (5) Tier 2 
Reports. 
"You have approximately three felonies and seven 
misdemeanors. This is your third state bid. Required statutory 
factors have been considered, including your risk to the 
community, rehabilitation efforts, and your needs for successful 
community re-en~, your discretionary release, at this time, 
would thus not be compatible with the welfare of society at 
large, and would tend to deprecate the seriousness of the instant 
offense, and undermine respect for the law." 
3 
[* 3]
Parole Release decisions are discretionary and, if made pursuant to statutory 
requirements, notreviewable (Matter ofDelrosario v Evans, 121AD3d1152, 1152-1153 [3d 
Dept., 2014]; Matter of Williams v New York State Division of Parole, 114 AD3d 992 [3d 
Dept., 2014; Matter of Campbell v Evans, 106 AD3d 1363, 1363-1364 [3d -Dept., 2013]). 
Furthermore, only a "showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety" on the part of the 
Parole Board has been found to necessitate judicial intervention (see Matter of Si~mon v 
Travis, 95 NY2d470, 476 [2000], quoting Matter of Russo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 
50 NY2d 69, 77 [1980]; see also Matter of Graziano v Evans, 90 AD3d 1367, 1369 [3d 
Dept., 2011 ]). In the absence of the above, there is no basis upon which to disturb the 
discretionary determination made by the Parole Board (see Matter of Perez v. New York 
State of Division of Parole, 294 AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 2002]). 
A review of the transcript of the parole interview reveals that, in addition to the instant 
offense, attention was paid to such factors as petitioner's institutional programming, his 
disciplinary record, and his plans upon release. It was noted that the petitioner has completed 
all recommended programs. The petitioner mentioned that if released, although he had family 
members residing in the Buffalo area, he would prefer to reside in a "mote structured" 
release setting. Inquiry-was made with regard to intentions with respect to employment. The 
petitioner responded by indicating that he has electrical, roofing, carpentry and mechanics 
training. He further indicated, however1 that he would really prefer to work with young 
people as a professional counselor. Commissioner Ludlow mentioned the finding in the 
COMP AS Instrument that he was at low risk for felony violence, arrest or absconding. There 
is no evidence in the record that the Parole Board pre-determined the disposition. Nor is 
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there evidence of any bias or an adversarial attitude on the part of the Commissioners. 
The Court finds that the Parole Board considered the relevant criteria in making its 
decision and its determination was supported by the record. The decision was sufficiently 
detailed to inform the petitioner of the reasons for the denial of parole and it satisfied the 
requirements of Executive Law §259-i (see Matter ofSiao-Pao, 11 NY3d 773 [2008]~ Matter 
of Whitehead v. Russi, 201AD2d825 [3rd Dept., 1994]; Matter of Green v. New York State 
Division of Parole, 199 AD2d 677 [3rd Dept., 1993 ]). It is proper and, in fact, required, that 
the Parole Board consider the seriousness of the inmate's crimes and their violent nature (see 
Matter of Williams v New York State Division of Parole, supra; Matter of Matos v New 
York State Board of Parole, 87AD3d1193 (3dDept., 2011]; Matter ofDudleyvTravis, 227 
AD2d 863, [3rd Dept., 1996), as well as the inmate's criminal history (see Matter of Farid v 
Travis, 239 AD2d 629 [3rd Dept., 1997]; Matter of Cohen v Gonzalez, 254 AD2d 556 [3rd 
Dept., 1998]). The Parole Board is not required to enumerate or give equal weight to each 
factor that it considered in determining the inmate's application, or to expressly discuss each 
one (see Matter of Davis v Evans, 105 AD3d 1305 [3d Dept., 2013]; Matter ofMacKenzie 
v Evans, 95 AD3d 1613 [3d Dept., 2012]; Matter of Matos v New York State Board of 
Parole, supra,; Matter ofYotingvNew York Division of Parole, 74 AD3d 1681, 1681-1682 
(3rd Dept., 2010]). Nor must the parole board recite the precise statutory language set forth 
in the first se tence of Executive Law§ 259-i (2) (c) (A) (see Matter of Silvera v Dennison, 
28 AD3d 859 [3rd Dept., 2006]). In other words, "[w]here appropriate the Board may give 
considerable weight to, or place particular emphasis on, the circumstances of the crimes for 
which a petitioner is incarcerated, as well as a petitioner's criminal history, together with the 
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other statutory factors, in determining whether the individual ~will live and remain at liberty 
without violating the law,' whether his or her 'release is not incompatible with the welfare 
of society,' and whether release will 'deprecate the seriousness of [the] crime as to 
undennine respect for [the] law"' (Matter of Durio vNew York State Division of Parole, 3 
AD3d 816 [3rd Dept., 2004], quoting Executive Law §259-i [2] [c] [A], other citations 
omitted) . . 
Petitioner's claims that the detennination to deny parole is tantamount to a 
resentencing, in violation of the double jeopardy clauses's prohibition against multiple 
punislunent are conclusory and without merit (see Matter of Bockeno v New York State 
Parole Board, 227 AD2d 7 51 [3rd Dept., 1996]; Matter of Crews v New York State Executive 
Department Board of Appeals Unit, 281 AD2d 672 [3rd Dept., 2001]; Matter of Evans v 
Dennison, 13Misc3d1236A, [Sup. Ct., West. Co., 2006]; Matter ofKalwasinski v Paterson, 
80 AD3d 1065, 1066 [3dDept., 2011]; Matter ofCarterv Evans, 81AD3d1031, 1031 [3d 
Dept., 2011]; Matter of Valentino v Evans, 92 AD3d 1054 [3d Dept., 2012]). The fact that 
an inmate has served his or her minimum sentence does not confer upon the inmate a 
protected liberty interest in parole release (see Matter ofMotti v Alexander, 54 AD3d 1114, 
1115 [3rd Dept., 2008]). The Parole Board is vested with the discretion to detennine whether 
release was appropriate notwithstanding the fact that the sentencing court set the minimum 
term of petitioner's sentence (see Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 4 70, 476 [2000]; 
Matter of Gomez v New York State Division of Parole, 87 AD3d 1197 [3d Dept., 2011]; 
Matter of Cody v Dennison, 33 AD2d 1141, 1142 [3rd Dept., 2006] lv denied 8 NY3d 802 
[2007]; Matter of Burress v Dennison, 37 AD3d 930 [Yd Dept., 2007]). 
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With regard to petitioner's arguments concerning an alleged violation of his right to 
due process, the Court first observes that there is no inherent right to parole under the 
constitution of either the United States or the State of New York (see Greenholtz v Inmates 
of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 US 1, 7 [1979]; Matter of Russo v 
New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 73, supra). It has been repeatedly held that 
Executive Law § 259-i does not create in any prisoner an entitlement to, or a legitimate 
expectation of, release; therefore, no constitutionally protected liberty interests are implicated 
by the Parole Board's exercise of its discretion to deny parole (see Barna v Travis, 23 9 F3d 
169, 171 [2d Cir., 2001]; Marvin v Goord, 255 F3d 40, 44 [2d Cir., 2001]; Boothe v 
Hammock, 605 F2d 661, 664 [2d Cir., 1979]; Paunetto v Hammock, 516 F Supp 1367, 1367-
1368 [SD NY, 1981]; Matter of Russo vNew York State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 75-76, 
supra, Matter of Gamez v Dennison, 18 AD3d 1099 [3rd Dept., 2005]; Matter of Lozada v 
New York State Div. of Parole, 36 AD3d 1046, 1046 [3rd Dept., 2007]). The Court, 
accordingly, finds no due process violation. 
As relevant here~ the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law (see L 2011ch62, Part 
C, Subpart A,§ 38-b, et seq.) made two changes with respect to how parole determinations 
are made. First, Executive Law § 259-c was revised to eliminate mention of Division of 
Parole guidelines (see 9 NYCRR 8001.3 [a]), in favor of requiring the Division of Parole to 
rely upon criteria that would place greater emphasis on assessing the degree to which inmates 
have been rehabilitated, and the probability that they would be able to remain crime-free if 
released (see Executive Law 259-c [4]). Said section now recites: "(t]he state board of 
parole shall I] (4) establish written procedures for its use in making parole decisions as 
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required by law. Such written procedures shall incorporate risk and needs principles to 
measure the rehabilitation of persons appearing before the board, the likelihood of success · 
of such persons upon release, and assist members of the state board of parole in detennining 
which inmates may be released to parole supervision" (Executive Law 259-c [4], enacted in 
L 2011ch62, Part C, Subpart A,§ 38-b). This amendment was made effective six months 
after its adoption on March 31, 2011, that is, on October 1, 2011 (see L 2011, ch 62, Part C, 
Subpart A, § 49-(f]) . In the second change, Executive 259-i (2) (c) was amended to 
incorporate into one section the eight factors which the Parole Board was to consider in 
making release detenninations (see L 2011 ch 62, Part C, Subpart A, § 28-f- l). This 
amendment was effective irrunediately upon its adoption on March 31, 2011 (see L 2011, 
ch 62, Part C, Subpart A, § 49). However, it did not result in a substantive change in the 
criteria which the Parole Board should consider in rendering its decision. 
The respondent issued a memorandum to Board members, dated October 5, 2011, 
specifically addressing the amendment to Executive Law § 259-c ( 4) and providing 
instruction concerning application of the statutory guidelines in light of the changes 
effectuated by the amendment. The memorandum directed that henceforth, the Parole Board 
must also consider the "steps an inmate has taken toward . .. rehabilitation" and "the 
likelihood of ... success once released". The memorandum directed that the Parole Board, 
in its review process, utilize a "transition accountability plan" ("TAP") which incorporates 
risk and needs principles, as well as a CO:MP AS Risk and Needs Assessments instrument. 
The Appellate Division, in Matter of Montane v Evans (116 AD3d 197, 200-303 [2014], Iv 
granted 23 NY3d 903 [ 2014], appeal dismissed_ NY3d _ [Dec. 16, 2014]) found no 
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error with regard to the manner in which the Division of Parole implemented the provisions 
of Executive Law§ 259-c (4), including use of the COMPAS Risk and Needs Assessment 
instrument. The Court specifically found no error in the alleged failure of the Division of 
Parole to promulgate regulations pursuant to Executive Law§ 259-c (4) (see id.~ see also 
Matter of Singh v Evans, 118 AD3d 1209, 1210 [3d Dept., 2014]). 
Here, the Parole Board properly engaged in a risk and needs assessment as required 
under Executive Law § 259-c ( 4 ), including review of the COMP AS instrument (see Matter 
of Delrosario v Evans, 121 AD3d 1152, supra; Matter of Partee v Evans, 117 AD3d 1258, 
1259 [3d Dept., 2014], lv denied 24 NY3d 901 [2014]). "The CO:MPAS instrument, 
however, is only one factor that the Board was required to consider in evaluating petitioner's 
request" (Matter of Matter ofRivera vNew York State Div. of Parole, 119 AD3d 1107, 1109 
[3d Dept., 2014]). 
With regard to Commissioner Ludlow's reference that petitioner's victim "was 
slashed pretty good based on the autopsy". The Court observes that the petitioner failed to 
correct the Commissioner during the parole interview at a time when the issue could be 
addressed by the Board (see Matter of Morrison v Evans, 81AD3d1073, at 1073-1074 [3d 
Dept., 2011]). Moreover, a review of respondent's determination (supra) reveals that the 
Parole Board correctly understood petitioner's role in the crime for which he stands 
convicted. There is nothing to demonstrate that the alleged factual inaccuracy resulted in a 
violation of petitioner's constitutional rights or involved matters that would have affected 
respondent's decision to deny parole (see, Matter of Brazill v New York State Bd. of Parole, 
76 AD2d 864; Matter of Rossney v New York State Board of Parole, 267 AD2d 648, 649 
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[3rd Dept., 1999]; see also, Matter of Richburg v New York State Division of Parole, 284 
AD2d 685, 686 [3rd Dept., 2001 ]). 
To address any issue with regard to respondent's alleged failure to prepare a 
transitional accountability plan ("TAP") as required under Correction Law§ 71-a, "[t]he 
language of the statute clearly applies only to newly admitted prisoners and is prospective 
in nature" (seeMatterofMatterofRivera vNewYork State Div. of Parole, 119AD3d 1107, 
1108-1109 [3d Dept., 2014 ]). Correction Law § 71-a was enacted on March 31, 201 1 and 
was effective six months thereafter (see L 2011, ch 62, § 1, part C, § 1, subpart A,§§ 16-a, 
49 [h]; Rivera v New York State Div. of Parole, supra). In this instance, the petitioner was 
received into custody by DOCCS 1997. As such, the respondent was not required to prepare 
a TAP. 
Lastly, the Parole Board's decision to hold petitioner for the maximum period (24 
months) is within the Board's discretion and was supported by the record (see Matter of 
Campbell v Evans, 106 AD3d 1363, supra, at 1364, citing Matter of Tatta v State of New 
York Division of Parole, 290 AD2d 907 [3rd Dept., 2002], Iv denied 98 NY2d 604 [2002]). 
The Court has reviewed petitioner's remaining arguments and contentions and finds 
them to be without merit. 
The Court finds the decision of the Parole Board was not irrational, in violation of 
lawful procedure, affected by an error of law, irrational or arbitrary and capricious. The 
petition must therefore be dismissed. 
The Court observes that certain records of a confidential nature relating to the 
petitioner were submitted to the Court as a part of the record. The Court, by separate order, 
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is sealing all records submitted for in camera review. 
Accordingly, it is 
ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that the petition be and hereby is dismissed. 
This shall constitute the decision, order and judgment of the Court. The original 
decision/order/judgment is returned to the attorney for the respondents. All other papers are 
being delivered by the Court to the County Clerk for filing. The signing of this 
decision/order/judgment and delivery of this decision/order/judgment does not constitute 
entry or filing under CPLR Rule 2220. Counsel is not relieved from the applicable 
provisions of that rule respecting filing, entry and notice of entry. 
Dated: 
ENTER 
February 3 , 2015 
Troy, New York George B. Ceresia, Jr. 
Supreme Court Justice 
Papers Considered: 
1. Order To Show Cause dated October 30, 2014, Petition, Supporting Papers 
and Exhibits 
2. Respondent's Answer dated January 8, 2015, Supporting Papers and 
Exhibits 
3. Affirmation of William B. Gannon, Esq., dated November 19, 2014, 
Supporting Papers and Exhibits 
4. Affirmation of Joshua E. McMahon, Assistant Attorney General, dated 




SUPREME COURT COUNTY OF ALBANY 
In The Matter of WILLIAM SWTH, 
Petitioner, 
-against-
NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF PAROLE, 
Respondent; 
For A Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules. 
Supreme CoUrt Albany County Article 78 Term 
Hon. George B. Ceresia, .Jr., S.upreme Court Justice Presiding 
RJI # 01-14-ST6226 Index No. 5331-14 
SEALING ORDER 
The following documents having been filed by the respondent with the Court for in 
camera review in connection with the above matter, namely, respondent's Exhibit B, 
Presentence Investigation Report, and respondent's Exhibit D, Confidential Portions of 
Parole Board Report, and Exhibit F, CO:MP AS Reentry Risk Assessment - Unredacted, it is 
hereby 
ORDERED, that the foregoing designated documents, including all duplicates and 
copies thereof, shall be filed as sealed instruments and not made available to any person or 
public or private agency unless by further order of the Court. 
ENTJ&:R 
Dated: February 3 , 2015 5[ - { A. 'l....X....,._,· Ult.>~ 
Troy, New York /~ George B. Ceresia, Jr. 
Supreme Court Justice 
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